The profound and often politicized question of "Who is Chinese?" was recently dissected by Professor Steve Tsang in a lecture hosted by Gresham College. Tsang, who specializes in the issue of China and Chineseness, argues that for someone who visibly appears to be of Chinese descent, the answer is "not as simple and straightforward as it seems or as it should be". His analysis conceptualizes identity and nationalism, noting that national identity, as taught by Benedict Anderson, is always forged with an element of myth creation. The core struggle he addresses is whether identity should be determined by the people themselves through consultation, where elected representatives act as agents of the people, or whether it should be imposed by a government or leadership. While people in the United Kingdom would naturally choose the former definition, believing citizens have the biggest say, the system operates differently in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
The Chinese government claims to articulate a single view for 1.4 billion people, one that can express collective feelings of anger, humiliation, or disapproval toward outside actions. This singular authority is organized into concentric circles: the outer circle is China and the Chinese people; the second circle is the Communist Party of China (CPC), which represents the state and the people; and the innermost core is supreme leader Xi Jinping, who took about five years to consolidate power, becoming the strongman leader around 2017. This centralized definition dictates that Chineseness today means being a Chinese patriot. While Chinese law and policy define ethnic minorities like Tibetans and Uyghurs as Chinese citizens, in practice, they are treated differently from Han people; for instance, a Uyghur or Tibetan might require police registration to check into a hotel in a large city, unlike a Han person. The cultural and civilizational traditions of the Han majority overwhelm the definition. The Chinese authorities genuinely deny allegations of genocide or crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, asserting instead that what are called concentration camps by human rights activists are "educational facilities" intended to bring these people up to become "proper Chinese". The Chinese term for a traitor, hen Han, meaning "betraying the Han people," further roots this patriotic standard in the Han heritage.
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The struggle for identity is acutely felt in Hong Kong, where the overwhelming majority of people are of Han heritage but often identify themselves as "Hong Kongers" or "Hong Kong Chinese," with those who simply feel "Chinese" forming a minority. Under the "One Country, Two Systems" framework, PRC law is clear that all people of Chinese descent in Hong Kong are Chinese citizens and do not have a choice in the matter. Furthermore, the Chinese government has extended this interpretation to assert that Hong Kong was never a British colony, but merely a territory under "illegal British occupation" for 153 years, which the Communist Party has "put right".
The situation regarding Taiwan introduces profound historical and legal complexities. While the Chinese government asserts that Taiwan "is and has always been Chinese from since ancient time" and must return to Chinese sovereignty, historical scholarship outside of China notes that the empire on the mainland did not exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan until the late 17th century. Notably, the People's Republic of China, founded in 1949, has exercised jurisdiction over Taiwan for "zero second". Ironically, Professor Tsang noted that the Chinese Communist Party itself was historically the strongest advocate for an independent Taiwan from the 1920s until the Cairo Conference in November 1943. The resulting Cairo Declaration, which agreed Taiwan could be ceded to Chiang Kai-shek at the end of the war, is often cited as the basis for the island’s return, despite having "no legal standing". Following Japan’s defeat, Taiwan’s status remained legally undetermined until the 1951 San Francisco peace conference. Today, despite PRC claims, 62.9% of people in Taiwan identify themselves as Taiwanese, and 30.5% identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese.
Finally, for the Chinese diaspora worldwide, the Chinese Nationality Law of 1980 clearly states that acquiring a foreign nationality automatically means losing Chinese nationality, a law introduced to protect overseas Chinese from anti-Chinese mass movements in host countries. However, Xi Jinping has recently overridden this legal standard, proclaiming that if "Chinese blood running through your veins" you are Chinese and should be a patriotic supporter. Because the PRC operates as a Leninist political system where the party superintends everything, the supreme leader’s word is now more important than the law. This ideological imposition risks providing fuel for "extreme right-wing opinions" in host countries, creating a serious risk of backlash against ethnic Chinese residents, regardless of their commitment to their adopted citizenship. In concluding his lecture, Professor Steve Tsang articulated the central normative question facing this vast population: Why should people of Chinese ethnicity be denied the same right as others to choose their identity or can this profound aspect of human life simply be left to the dictates of a political party or a single supreme leader.
